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Abstract
The composition of capital inﬂows to emerging market economies tends to follow a predictable
dynamic pattern across the business cycle. In most emerging market economies, total inﬂows are
pro-cyclical, with debt and portfolio equity ﬂowing in ﬁrst, followed later in the expansion by
foreign direct investment (FDI). To understand the dynamic composition of these ﬂows, we use a
small open economy (SOE) framework to model the composition of capital inﬂows as the equilib-
rium outcome of emerging market ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing decisions. We show how costly external ﬁnancing
and FDI search costs generate a state contingent cost of ﬁnancing such that the cheapest source
of ﬁnancing depends on the phase of the business cycle. In this manner, the ﬁnancial frictions are
able to explain the interaction between the types of ﬂows and deliver a time-varying composition
of ﬂows, as well as other standard features of emerging market business cycles. If, as this work
suggests, ﬂows are an equilibrium outcome of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing decisions, then volatility of capital
inﬂows is not necessarily bad for an economy. Furthermore, using capital controls to shut down one
type of ﬂow and encourage another is certain to have both short- and long-run welfare implications.
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11 Introduction
The dynamic composition of gross private capital inﬂows to emerging market economies can be
characterized by three stylized facts. First, total inﬂows are highly correlated with investment. Second,
the individual components of the ﬁnancial account behave diﬀerently depending on where the economy
is in the business cycle. Third, correlations between the types of ﬂows suggest there is some degree
of substitutability between those ﬂows.
Across many of the emerging market economies, total gross private inﬂows are positively cor-
related with investment.1 As Table 1 reports, the correlation between investment and total inﬂows
for emerging markets is on average 0:25. These correlations do vary by region with Eastern Europe
showing the highest correlation of 0:338, followed by Latin America at 0:254 and East Asia and the
Paciﬁc at 0:225. Table 1 also reports this correlation on a country basis. While the individual country
correlations show some heterogeneity in magnitude, qualitatively most countries share a signiﬁcant
positive relationship, with the exception of Indonesia and Chile. These positive correlations between
capital inﬂows and investment suggest capital is ﬂowing into the emerging market economies to ﬁnance
investment needs rather than to smooth consumption directly.
While total gross inﬂows typically have a strong positive relationship with investment, the corre-
lations between a particular type of ﬂow and investment vary dramatically. Across regions, Table 1
shows that debt has a positive correlation with investment, foreign direct investment (FDI) has a neg-
ative correlation, and portfolio investment has essentially no correlation. This suggests that the type
of capital ﬂowing in depends on the stage of the business cycle. Speciﬁcally for Mexico, investment
and debt have a positive correlation of 0:389 and investment and FDI have a negative correlation
of  0:313. To show that these correlations are not being driven exclusively by capital ﬂow volatility
during the 1994 economic crisis in Mexico, Figure 1 plots the ten-year rolling correlations from 1990
to 2006. While the crisis certainly seemed to have an impact on the ﬂows, after 1994 the correlations
remain fairly stable.
Data on the correlations between types of capital ﬂows suggest that emerging market ﬁrms sub-
1In this paper, we focus on gross private inﬂows. All capital ﬂow data is from the International Monetary Fund’s
International Financial Statistics (IFS). Foreign direct investment refers to line “Foreign direct investment in reporting
economy, N.I.E.” Portfolio investment refers to line “Portfolio investment, equity securities, liabilities.” Debt refers to
the sum of lines “Portfolio investment, debt securities, liabilities” and “Other investment, liabilities.” Total inﬂows refers
to the sum of the foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, and debt. The three series are generally shown as a
fraction of gross domestic product.
2stitute one form of ﬁnancing for another. Table 2 shows the correlation between ﬂows for various
countries. Across diﬀerent countries and regions, the degree of substitutability (negative correlation)
or complementarity (positive correlation) varies. In Mexico, FDI is negatively correlated with debt
and portfolio equity inﬂows. Figure 2 shows how the correlations between inﬂows ﬂuctuate over time
in Mexico.
This paper explains these three stylized facts by modeling capital inﬂows as a source of ﬁnancing
for ﬁrms in a small open economy (SOE). Assuming ﬁnancial frictions are nontrivial, a ﬁrm must
decide not only how much to invest but how best to ﬁnance a particular project. Theoretically, going
back to Modigliani and Miller (1958), if sources of ﬁnancing are perfect substitutes, then a ﬁrm can
simply focus on how much to invest and randomly choose ﬁnancing without aﬀecting the value of the
ﬁrm. Since capital ﬂows are a source of ﬁnancing, in a world with no ﬁnancial frictions a country’s
external capital structure would be indeterminate and there would be no visible pattern in the ﬂows.
Yet, the fact that a particular country does seem to favor one type of ﬂow over another and that
these ﬂows tend to vary with the business cycle suggest that these forms of ﬁnancing are not perfect
substitutes and that the frictions force the inﬂow composition to vary over the business cycle.
The focus of our paper is on the dynamic composition of capital inﬂows. In contrast, most of the
existing literature has focused on the long-run (i.e., static) determinants of the composition of capital
inﬂows. The particular focus of the existing literature has been on explaining the revealed preference
of FDI over other types of inﬂows. Razin et al. (1998) argue that while information asymmetries
for foreigners inherently exist, these barriers can be overcome by investors actually producing in the
emerging markets through FDI. Albuquerque (2003) argues that the lack of enforceability of claims in
many emerging markets makes portfolio equity and debt less desirable than FDI for foreign investors.
Hull and Tesar (2001) see the specialization beneﬁts of FDI and the risk-sharing beneﬁts of portfolio
equity, suggesting the composition of ﬂows can be complementary. While these factors may favor
one type of ﬂow, they are unlikely to be able to explain the dynamic composition of inﬂows and its
relation to the business cycle. Moreover, these diﬀerent theories focus in most part on the decision
of the suppliers of funds (foreigners) to determine the resulting capital structure of the emerging
market. Importantly, our model focuses on the demand considerations of the domestic ﬁrms given the
constraints they face.
Since the early 1990s, there has been a surge in empirical work trying to establish whether changes
3in composition and volatility of capital ﬂows are due to shifts in the supply of funds by foreign investors
(push) or in the demand by domestic residents (pull). The policy concern is that, if capital is being
pushed into emerging markets, it would be optimal for emerging market economies to design policies
that encourage certain kinds of ﬂows (e.g., long-term debt vs. short-term debt, FDI vs. portfolio
ﬂows) so that it would be more diﬃcult for foreigners to reduce the supply dramatically if conditions
changed in the emerging market. If ﬁnancial frictions are nontrivial, however, government policies
that target certain types of ﬂows directly raise the cost of ﬁnancing, leading to a reduction in welfare.
The empirical ﬁndings suggest that indeed both "push" and "pull" factors are needed to understand
the composition of ﬂows. Faria and Mauro (2004) provide empirical evidence on the importance of
institutions in determining the external capital structure of a country. Faria et al. (2007) study the
determinants of the cross-sectional composition of inﬂows between 1996 and 2004 and they ﬁnd that
ﬁnancial development increases the share of equity inﬂows. Wei (2000) studies the impact of corruption
on the dynamic properties of capital ﬂows to emerging economies.
In the model presented here, ﬁnancial frictions are present and ﬁrms are forced to optimize over
an array of ﬁnancing choices. A ﬁrm chooses not only the type of ﬁnancing instrument but the owner
of that instrument by choosing to raise capital among domestic agents and foreigners. In our model,
agents face two sources of ﬁnancial frictions: issuance costs for international debt and equity, which are
paid by domestic ﬁrms, and FDI search costs, which are paid by foreigners.2 To motivate why issuance
costs are nontrivial, we focus on the large body of literature showing that external ﬁnance is more
costly to ﬁrms than using retained earnings. The theoretical underpinnings are typically attributed
to the existence of transaction costs, moral hazard, or asymmetric information. Like Gomes et al.
(2006) and Bond and Meghir (1994), we posit a cost function for raising capital externally instead
of being concerned with the optimal contract. While the functional form of these costs may diﬀer
depending on the source of market imperfection, most models share two common features. Financing
costs increase as more capital is raised and costs decrease as the size of the ﬁrm, measured by its
capital stock, increases. To provide some motivation for these two properties of costly external ﬁnance,
we appeal to the literature on transaction costs associated with public oﬀerings. To launch an equity
or debt oﬀering, the domestic ﬁrms pay direct and indirect transaction costs based on the ﬁrm size
2The institutions within an emerging market have a large impact on the magnitude of the ﬁnancial frictions. In
terms of issuing costs, more stringent accounting standards make it easier for foreigners to value a ﬁrm. In terms of
search costs, greater contract enforcement increases the probability of a match.
4and the size of the oﬀering. The direct costs consist of administrative fees and underwriting costs.
Data for the U.S. shows that while administrative fees are minimal, the underwriting discount can be
substantial. According to Lee et al. (1996) direct costs are on average 7% of the proceeds of seasoned
equity oﬀerings, 11% for initial public oﬀerings, and 2 to 3% for bond issuances. 3
The second friction in our model is that multinational ﬁrms face search costs when purchasing
a domestic ﬁrm. Due to diﬀerent degrees of access to external ﬁnancing, the value of a ﬁrm to a
foreigner and to a domestic agent may diﬀer. Therefore, multinationals have an incentive to purchase
these ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms and provide them with less costly capital. We assume that ﬁnding
a suitable company to buy takes eﬀort and is therefore costly. Depending on the phase of the business
cycle, the domestic ﬁrm may be more constrained, and thus the marginal beneﬁt of buying that
ﬁrm may be higher. As such, foreign ﬁrms are willing to exert more eﬀort in trying to match.4 This
mechanism is very close in spirit to the one presented in Aguiar and Gopinath (2005). The main
diﬀerence is that they argue that this channel of FDI ﬁnancing occurs only during crises, while in our
model, the need for FDI ﬁnancing is present throughout the business cycle.
Financial frictions are able to explain the interaction between the types of ﬂows and deliver a time-
varying composition of ﬂows within a framework that is consistent with other features of emerging
market business cycles. 5 To test the ability of these ﬁnancial frictions to explain observed patterns
in capital ﬂows, we calibrate our theoretical model to the Mexican economy and simulate the model.
Because the model does not incorporate capital control policy, we choose Mexico for its history of
relatively few restrictions on capital inﬂows. We ﬁnd that for reasonable values of the costs we are
able to match quite well Mexico’s private capital inﬂow structure over time.
3Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) argue that agency problems increase with the size of the issuance, generating increasing
marginal costs.
4While we discuss FDI in terms of mergers and acquisitions, the same friction would apply to greenﬁeld investments
(setting up a subsidiary from scratch). If land were modeled explicitly as an input into production, the domestic
landowner could be thought of as an agent who is severely constrained and who holds an option for future production.
This suggests that both types of FDI should move together and can be explained by multinationals searching for potential
buy-outs in terms of actual ﬁrms or options for future ﬁrms.
5The ﬁnancing costs generate a counter-cyclical ﬁnancing premium, raising the domestic interest rate above the
world interest rate which is consistent with the theoretical ﬁndings of Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006).
52 An equilibrium model of capital ﬂow determination
The goal of this paper is to provide a theoretical model to help disentangle the co-movement between
diﬀerent types of capital ﬂows across the business cycle. We start with a canonical model of ﬁrm
ﬁnancing decisions and we augment it to ﬁt an international framework appropriate for emerging
markets. The model can be summarized as an SOE model with ﬁnancial frictions and two sets of
agents: foreign and domestic. The domestic SOE consists of ﬁrms and households. The domestic ﬁrms
are subject to non-diversiﬁable productivity shocks and make decisions to ﬁnance investment. The
ﬁrms invest in proﬁtable projects and have the power to trade bonds and equity with the rest of
the world. Domestic ﬁrms face debt costs and the potential to be bought out by multinational ﬁrms.
The households are risk averse and receive income from wages and from dividends paid by domestic
ﬁrms. Domestic agents take the world interest rate as given. There are two kinds of foreign agents:
the aforementioned multinational ﬁrms who search to purchase domestic ﬁrms and the global credit
market of one-period bonds that determines the world real interest rate. Unlike the domestic ﬁrms
that are limited by ﬁnancial frictions, the multinational ﬁrms are unconstrained. However, they face
search costs in ﬁnding a ﬁrm to purchase in the domestic economy.
2.1 Domestic households
A large number of identical, inﬁnitely lived households inhabit the SOE. Households choose con-






where U is a concave, continuously diﬀerentiable, instantaneous utility function. Households receive
utility from consumption of perishable goods, ct. Labor supply, l, is inelastic. Households face the
following period-t budget constraint:
st
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The households receive income from labor, wtl, and receipts on domestic discount bonds, bd
t. In
addition, households receive a payoﬀ from owning shares in domestic ﬁrms. Given there are a large
6number of identical ﬁrms, we assume households purchase equity by buying a share in a mutual fund
that is comprised of these ﬁrms. The payoﬀ on equity consists of three components. First, households
who hold shares st are paid dividends divt. Second, while households cannot sell domestic shares
abroad directly, each period multinationals buyout a portion of these domestic ﬁrms. t represents
the portion of domestic ﬁrms purchased by multinationals and therefore the portion of domestic house-
holds’ assets that are transferred to the multinationals. If a buyout occurs, the domestic shareholders
receive V NASH
t per share. Third, households can sell shares st with price pt to another domestic agent.




t). The net domestic real interest rate is rd
t. Given that labor is inelastically supplied, we
normalize the labor supply to be equal to unity.
Domestic households’ optimality conditions
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; (2.4)
where Uct represents the marginal utility of period-t consumption. The ﬁrst condition is the standard
Euler equation that determines the dynamics of domestic bond demand. The second condition equates
the marginal cost of buying a share of equity and the marginal beneﬁt that share provides.
Iterating equation (2.4) forward and imposing a non-bubble condition we can determine the price











The price of a share is the discounted stream of dividends adjusted for the fact that a time varying
portion of domestic assets may be purchased by a multinational.
72.2 Domestic ﬁrms
The value of the domestic ﬁrm is derived from the discounted value of returns on labor and capital. In
addition, the value reﬂects the chance that the ﬁrm may be sold abroad. Every period the ﬁrms in the
SOE face a time-varying probability, t, of being bought by a foreigner which is taken as given. The
price of the sold ﬁrm, V NASH
t , is also taken as given and determined by the Nash bargain between the
emerging market ﬁrm and the foreign ﬁrm, which we discuss later. Firms pay domestic households
dividends and any proceeds from the sale of the ﬁrm to foreigners. Thus, the domestic value of the
ﬁrm at any point in time, V D
t , is given by
V D
t = divt + tV NASH






where Mt+1 is the stochastic discount factor and divt are dividends paid to households.
There are a large number of identical ﬁrms in the SOE producing a single tradable good using a
ﬁxed labor input, l, and variable capital, kt. Firms produce the single tradeable good using a constant-
returns-to-scale (CRS) technology yt = exp(t)f(kt), where t is a Markov productivity shock and yt
is output. Given a sequence of discount factors, Mt+j, and purchase probabilities, t, in a competitive
equilibrium, domestic ﬁrms choose sequences of dividends, divt, desired capital stock, kt+1, and foreign
borrowing, bt+1, to maximize the present value of dividends:
V D (kt;bt;t;t) = max
kt+1;bt+1
divt + tV NASH
t + (1   t)E[Mt+1V D (kt+1;bt+1;t+1;t+1)] (2.7)
where









We assume that only domestic ﬁrms and not domestic households have access to foreign capital
markets. Domestic ﬁrms issue debt abroad to ﬁnance domestic projects. International bonds pay an
interest rate r
t = r exp(t). The mean world interest rate is denoted by r, and t is a Markov world
interest rate shock. The world interest rate is only contingent on the shock t and not on any domestic
state variable.
8Domestic ﬁrms face frictions in ﬁnancing domestic investment projects; therefore, the value of
the ﬁrm is lower than if there were no constraints. Firms face adjustment costs when they want to





. We assume that the bond issuance cost
function is increasing and strictly positive for bt+1 > 0. The motivation for the cost function is the
notion that external ﬁnancing is more costly than self ﬁnancing. While the form of this function may
diﬀer depending on the source of market imperfection, Gomes et al. (2006) and Bond and Meghir
(1994) ﬁnd that most models exhibit increasing marginal costs after controlling for the existing ﬁrm
size as proxied by capital stock.6 The relevant proxy for ﬁrm size is today’s capital stock rather than
the future capital stock; therefore, kt is used in the ﬁnancing cost function.
Domestic ﬁrms’ optimality conditions
When ﬁrms want to invest, they can either use domestic ﬁnancing (reduce dividends) or borrow
from the world credit market.7 The ﬁrms choose the optimal capital stock and source of ﬁnancing to
minimize costs and maximize returns. Both the marginal cost of ﬁnancing and the type of funds used
ﬂuctuate over the business cycle.
The optimality conditions for the domestic ﬁrms’ maximization problem in equation (2.7) are
given by





























= (1   t)Et [Mt+1 (1 + r
t)]: (2.10)
The ﬁrst condition, equation (2.9), equates the cost of postponing dividend payments today with the
marginal return to investing those dividends and producing more in the next period. The marginal
return to investing in the ﬁrm is driven by the discounted return to capital tomorrow. This is given
by the marginal product of capital in the next period net of depreciation and conditional on the ﬁrm
remaining a domestic ﬁrm. One additional beneﬁt reﬂected in the marginal return to investing is that







term. The discount factor
applied to the marginal return of investment is driven by the households’ marginal rate of substitution,
6The current size of the ﬁrm is known at the time that the new debt is issued.
7The composition of domestic ﬁnancing is indeterminant due to the fact that domestic equity and debt are perfect
substitutes. The ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between lowering dividends and issuing domestic bonds.
9Mt+1 and the search frictions 1 t. The search frictions alter the probability the domestic ﬁrm will
be purchased, t, and make investment more volatile. Firms have to make investment decisions,
unsure whether or not they may be bought out. As the probability of being purchased increases,
the marginal beneﬁt of investing falls. The ﬁnancial frictions also impact the discount rate indirectly
through the marginal rate of substitution. Costly external ﬁnancing lowers consumption via the
resource constraint, raising the intertemporal price of consumption.
The second condition, equation (2.10), equates the marginal beneﬁt of borrowing, net of the cost
of issuance, and the marginal cost of borrowing in terms of interest payments in the next period.
These costs are discounted by the stochastic discount factor and are conditional on the ﬁrm not being
sold to a foreigner through FDI. In this way, the search friction reduces the eﬀective cost of borrowing
for ﬁrms. Firms would like to borrow more if they are more likely to be purchased.
Return to investment
The ﬁnancial frictions aﬀect the returns to investing in the domestic economy in several ways. We
can combine the domestic ﬁrms’ optimality conditions for bonds in equation (2.10) and capital in

































where the marginal product of capital, accounting for depreciation and decreased future bond issuance
costs, is given by ^ MPKt+1 = exp(t+1) @







. Examining the ﬁrst




















increases the eﬀective borrowing rate. Both of these terms raise the expected marginal product of
capital in the next period and depress desired investment. Costly ﬁnance, costly search, and the
probability of being bought also aﬀect the path of consumption through the resource constraint and
through the impact on domestic interest rates. By rewriting equation (2.11), we can see how this





























Looking at (2.12), we see the ﬁrst two terms are standard determinants of the returns to investing.
Due to the frictions, the third term shows that an increase in the magnitude of the ﬁnancial friction
will drive the investment return even further above the world interest rate. Because the returns
to investing are driven by the domestic ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing decisions, investment and consumption are
correlated and the Fisherian separation of savings and investment does not result. Thus, frictions
increase the correlation between savings and investment, helping to explain the Feldstein and Horioka
(1980) puzzle.
The domestic interest rate
Putting together the households’ optimality condition for domestic bonds in equation (2.3) and the
ﬁrms’ optimality condition for international debt (2.10), we can express the domestic economies’
return on bonds rd
t as a function of the world’s return on bonds r
























If there were zero cost of issuance, b = 0, and no FDI, t = 0, equation (2.13) reduces to:
1 + rd












Any diﬀerence between the domestic interest rate and the world interest rate would be due to the
covariance between the international interest rate and the stochastic discount factor. Given that in
equilibrium the ﬁrms’ stochastic discount factor equals the households’ intertemporal marginal rate
of substitution, deviations from interest rate parity would be generated by any additional risk to
domestic consumption from world interest rate movements. This risk leads to domestic households
engaging in precautionary savings. This interest rate wedge is a standard result of small open economy
models.
11With ﬁnancial frictions (positive cost of issuance and search), the relationship between the do-
mestic interest rate and the world interest rate is determined by the direct impact of the frictions on
equation (2.13) and by their indirect impact on the stochastic discount factor. The ﬁnancial frictions
generate a wedge between the interest rate determined on world credit markets and the domestic
interest rate. There are two components of the wedge: one is driven by the probability the domestic
ﬁrm will be bought out by a multinational and the other is driven by costly external ﬁnancing. A
higher probability of a ﬁrm being bought by a foreigner decreases the domestic interest rate relative
to the world interest rate. The marginal cost of investing using debt falls because ﬁrms face a higher
probability that they will not have to pay the debt back in the future.
This wedge varies with the business cycle. For example, if the domestic economy is in a recession
and receives a positive productivity shock, domestic ﬁrms would like to invest. However, since their
capital stock is relatively low at that point in the business cycle, the cost of borrowing abroad,
@b
@bt+1,
is high and this drives the domestic interest rate up. Foreigners who do not face costs and constraints
are more likely to want to invest. Therefore, multinationals are willing to exert more eﬀort to increase
their probability of matching, which raises t. As the domestic ﬁrms invest and the economy expands,
the ﬁnancing premium falls and the domestic interest rate approaches the world interest rate.
2.3 Foreign multinationals
We assume that there is a search friction when foreign multinationals purchase domestic ﬁrms. We
further assume that the foreign multinationals are unconstrained and have a zero outside opportunity.
Finally, we assume that, once a domestic ﬁrm is found, the multinational and the domestic ﬁrm engage
in bargaining to set the sale price of the domestic ﬁrm.
Let V F
t be the unconstrained value of domestic ﬁrms and Vt be the constrained value of domestic
ﬁrms. Given our assumption that multinationals are unconstrained (i.e., b = 0), the unconstrained












Implicit in this expression is the timing assumption that ﬁrms are taken over after dividends to
domestic households are paid. We can iterate this expression of the value of the ﬁrm to obtain the
12usual result that the value of the ﬁrm to the foreigner is the discounted value of dividends. In the

















The after-dividend value of the ﬁrm to the domestic agent, Vt, is given by iterating forward (2.7)











The multinationals’ valuations of the domestic ﬁrms and the domestic ﬁrms’ own valuations diﬀer
for two reasons. First, the stochastic discount factors diﬀer because the households in the emerging
markets do not have access to foreign capital. Second, because the foreign multinationals are not
constrained they make diﬀerent choices concerning the optimal capital stock, so kf 6= kd, which is
reﬂected in the dividend policy.
The surplus of a sale of a constrained ﬁrm, S, is the diﬀerence between the constrained and







The inequality comes from the fact that the domestic value of ﬁrm is the constrained value of the
ﬁrm, while the value of the ﬁrm to foreigners is unconstrained.
The Nash-bargaining price, V NASH
t , divides the surplus from equation (2.17) between the domestic
ﬁrm and the multinational based on the domestic ﬁrm’s bargaining power,  ;
V NASH






The foreign multinational knows that it pays V NASH
t if it ﬁnds a domestic ﬁrm.
We assume that the probability that a foreign multinational matches with a domestic ﬁrm is a
function of search eﬀort, et. Eﬀort costs, (et), are expressed in terms of tradeable units and we
assume that this cost is increasing in eﬀort. Foreign ﬁrms choose search eﬀort, e, to maximize the










where (et) is the probability of a match, which depends on the eﬀort spent on searching.
Working with the ﬁrst-order conditions for the multinationals, we can see that the amount of FDI









As the domestic value of the ﬁrm, Vt, increases, the valuation wedge, (V F
t  V NASH
t ), falls forcing
less FDI to occur and the share of domestic ownership to increase.
Other models have also attributed a valuation wedge as the impetus behind FDI ﬂows. However,
the reason for the valuation wedge can stem from a variety of factors. Chari et al. (2004) argue
multinationals bring better institutions (e.g., better governance) and Alfaro and Charlton (2007)
suggest multinationals oﬀer knowledge transfers. Indeed, those “static” factors may be important in
the long run in determining the degree of foreign ownership in an emerging market economy. In
addition to these other alternative factors, we suggest here that access to ﬁnancing plays a role in
generating a wedge between the valuation of a ﬁrm to domestic residents and to foreign buyers.
Unlike other theories, the beneﬁt of this access to ﬁnancing theory is that it can explain why changes
in foreign ownership, FDI, tends to vary over the business cycle.
Substitutability of inﬂows
In the model, the key to why FDI ﬂows and bond ﬂows are negatively correlated is dependent on
the volume and value of FDI ﬂows moving separately. FDI is driven by two components, the change
in foreign ownership (volume), (et), and the value at which the domestic ownership rights are sold,
V NASH
t . When desired capital next period is high, ﬁrms are willing to ﬁnance projects using costly
external ﬁnance so debt increases, which in turn drives the domestic interest rate above the world
interest rate. Because these ﬁnancing costs are faced by domestic agents and not by the multinationals,
the surplus that the multinationals can gain from a buyout increases. As the beneﬁt to matching
14rises, multinationals increase their eﬀort to search, increasing the probability a ﬁrm is purchased,
(et). However V NASH
t at this time is relatively low, since the capital stock is low in the domestic
economy, pushing down the option value for the domestic agents. As the domestic economy expands,
the capital stock increases, driving up the option value and increasing V NASH
t , and thus FDI. At the
very beginning of an economic expansion, more domestic ﬁrms are purchased by foreigners but at a
relative discount, causing FDI ﬂows to be small. It is only later in the cycle as foreigners are forced
to pay a higher price to purchase an emerging market ﬁrm that FDI ﬂows increase.
Incorporating portfolio equity
For many of the emerging market economies in recent years, portfolio equity has also been a source
of capital. The role of portfolio equity in the composition of capital ﬂows can easily be added to the
existing framework with the addition of two assumptions. The ﬁrst assumption is that dividends face
a lower bound. Both reducing dividends and issuing secondary shares are essentially the same use of
equity. Therefore, if portfolio equity issuance is costly, like debt, then the ﬁrm would always choose
to reduce dividends rather than pay the external ﬁnancing costs. In order to make the portfolio
equity cost relevant, dividends must be limited. Second, we assume that equity issuance must be
non-negative, so that the dividend constraint may bind.
The value of the domestic ﬁrm is derived from the discounted value of returns on labor and capital.
To account for secondary oﬀerings, we must adjust the value of the ﬁrm to reﬂect both the possibility
that new shares, sect, may be issued and that there is some chance the ﬁrm will be purchased by a
foreigner. To incorporate the impact of new issuance on ﬁrm value, we follow Fazzari et al. (1988)
and adjust dividends, divt, by the dilution that arises from the secondary equity issuance, sect:
g divt  divt   sect
where g divt is the measure of adjusted dividends.
The total value of the ﬁrm, V D
t , is the present value of dividends adjusted for the present value
of new shares that would have to be bought by current equity holders to maintain a proportional






to the bond issuance cost that also reduces dividends paid to households. With secondary oﬀerings
15as an additional ﬁnancing option, the maximization problem for the ﬁrm in equation (2.7) is altered
somewhat as indicated below;
V D (kt;bt;t;t) = max
kt;bt;sect
g divt + tV NASH
t + (1   t)E[Mt+1V D (kt+1;bt+1;t+1;t+1)]; (2.21)
subject to the two additional constraints:
divt 0; (2.22)
sect 0: (2.23)
If a ﬁrm chooses to issue new shares, all the existing owners choose to buy the shares to maintain
their existing ownership portion of the ﬁrm. This holds true for both the domestic and foreign owners.
When the multinationals buy up these publicly traded shares, capital ﬂows into the domestic economy
in the form of portfolio equity.
2.4 Market clearing conditions











t = 1. Given the large number of identical domestic ﬁrms, following Pissarides (1985) the
probability a ﬁrm is taken over is equal to the portion of domestic ﬁrms taken over.8 Therefore, t, the
probability of a ﬁrm buyout is equal to t, the portion of domestic assets taken over by multinationals.
Given t=t the law of motion for the stock of FDI, (1   t), follows below:
t+1 = t (1   t) + (1   t); (2.24)
where  is an exogenous separation rate. Domestic ownership for the entire economy falls as the
portion of domestic ﬁrms that match increases. Gross FDI inﬂows may be zero or even negative due
to the exogenous separation. When a merger falls apart, and the multinational separates from the
domestic ﬁrm, the foreign ownership is assumed back into the domestic capital stock. Considering that
8Pissarides (1985) shows in a labor market search and matching model that the probability of ﬁnding a job match
determines the economy wide employment rate.
16some ﬁrms are owned by domestic agents and some by foreigners, the sum of all dividends paid out to
domestic agents must be equal to tdivt. Likewise the payout to the households by the multinationals
is tV NASH
t t.
Using these market clearing conditions and the household budget constraint, equation (2.2), we
can deﬁne the resource constraint for the economy:
ct =
 
tdivt + ttV NASH
t   Vt(1   t)

+ wt: (2.25)
Thus, aggregate consumption equals the sum of the share of dividends paid to domestic residents, net
proceeds from buyouts by foreigners, and wage income.
We deﬁne gross investment as it  kt+1   kt (1   ). Substituting into the aggregate household
budget constraint in equation (2.25) the deﬁnition of investment and dividends in equation (2.8) and
ignoring issuance costs, we derive the following expression:
0 = yt   ct   it | {z }
net exports
+ (1   t)divt   r





bonds z }| {
bt+1   bt +




  Vt(1   t)+








This equation is simply the balance of payments for the model economy, which allows us to match
the model to the data.
In the decentralized equilibrium, since the households own the ﬁrms, the discount rate of the ﬁrm








2.5 Stochastic processes and competitive equilibrium
To complete the model, we specify the stochastic process for the productivity shocks, et, and the
world interest rate shocks, zt. We assume that both of these shocks follow a ﬁrst-order autoregressive
process and they are possibly correlated. We discretize the process for the two shocks using a simple
persistence rule.
Given a stochastic process of productivity shocks, interest rate shocks, and initial conditions, a
17competitive equilibrium is deﬁned by stochastic sequences of allocations [ct;l;bt+1;kt+1;et], prices
[wt;rd
t], and value functions, [V NASH
t ;V D
t ;V F
t ], such that: (a) domestic ﬁrms maximize dividends
subject to the constant returns-to-scale technology, taking factor and goods prices as given, (b)
households maximize utility subject to the budget constraint taking as given factor prices, goods
prices, and asset prices, (c) foreign multinationals maximize their surplus, and (d) the market-clearing
conditions for equity, labor, and goods markets hold.
3 Recursive equilibrium and numerical solution technique
The model’s competitive equilibrium is solved by reformulating it in recursive form and applying a
numerical solution method in a similar manner to Mendoza and Smith (2006). The challenge of the
numerical solution is to keep track of optimizations for all four agents: domestic households, domestic
ﬁrms, foreign investors (debt and equity holders), and foreign multinational ﬁrms.
To facilitate computation of the equilibrium, we represent the domestic economy’s problem (house-
hold and domestic ﬁrm) as a domestic social planner’s problem. The domestic social planner makes
investment, international borrowing, and secondary oﬀering allocations. The advantage to solving
the problem in this manner is that one can use the concavity of the utility function to get a unique
solution on a coarser grid, which is more eﬃcient given the multiple endogenous state variables.
In a similar manner to Mendoza and Oviedo (2006) and Kehoe (1987), the equilibrium between
the domestic social planner and the multinationals is solved as a Nash Equilibrium of a two player
dynamic game under uncertainty where both players move simultaneously. To solve for the equi-
librium, the domestic social planner and the multinationals formulate there optimal plans taken as
given a conjecture of the optimal plans’ of the other agent. Given the multinational’s conjectured
eﬀort level in searching for a domestic ﬁrm to buy, the domestic social planner infers a probability of
a match and the selling price of the ﬁrm, which are used to determine the optimal investment, inter-
national borrowing, and secondary oﬀering allocations. Likewise, given a conjecture of the domestic
social planners capital and debt decisions, the multinational infers the buyout price and solves for the
optimal eﬀort level in procuring a match.
The domestic social planner faces the following state variables: capital, k, and international bor-
rowing, b, as the endogenous state variables and  and  as the exogenous states. The domestic social
18planner takes as given ^ V NASHand e , which are the price that the agents receive if part of the capital
stock is sold to multinationals and the portion of domestic assets sold, respectively. The optimal

















+ w + e (k;b;;) ^ V NASH(k;b;;)
0 = 

1   e (k;b;;)

+ (1   )
The solutions of this problem are represented by the optimal decision rules for capital ^ k0(k;b;;) and
bonds ^ b0(k;b;;). Using the decision rules, the value of the ﬁrm to domestic agents is determined by
equation (2.16), giving us ^ V (k;b;;).
The multinationals use their conjecture of e V (k;b;;) to determine \ V NASH and then choose their
eﬀort level in matching, ^ e(k;b;;), to satisfy (2.20). Knowing how much eﬀort the multinational is
willing to exert directly determines the probability of a match ^ (k;b;;).
This equilibrium, if it exists, is a competitive equilibrium for the small open economy. From the
Bellman equation (3.1) for the domestic ﬁrm, we can see the ﬁrst order conditions that result from
the standard Benveniste-Sheinkman equation equal the Euler equations associated with the domestic
ﬁrms’ ﬁrst order conditions with respect to capital and debt in equations (2.9) and (2.10).10 On the
multinationals side we use the ﬁrst order conditions to determine the decision rule for search eﬀort,
et, guaranteeing the competitive equilibrium outcome.
The general outline of the solution algorithm is to solve the social planner’s problem, given the
conjecture of the portion of the domestic assets sold to the foreigners, e (k;b;;) and the price at
9Notice that here we are showing the problem assuming the ﬁrms can also issue secondary shares.
10The ﬁrst order conditions to the social planner’s problem diﬀer slightly from the competitive equilibrium in that
the social planner takes into account the exogenous separation rate. As long as the separation rate and FDI stocks are
small the diﬀerence is trivial.
19which the domestic ﬁrms are sold, ^ V NASH(k;b;;), using standard dynamic programming techniques.
Given the optimal allocations of consumption, investment, and ﬁnancing, the value of the ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrm is determined. This is then used to determine \ V NASH. \ V NASH is plugged into the
foreign multinationals’ ﬁrst-order conditions to determine the multinationals’ eﬀort levels, et, which in
turn determines b (k;b;;). In equilibrium ^  = ^ , so ^ (k;b;;) and \ V NASH become the new conjec-
tures for the domestic social planner. The process continues until \ V NASH(k;b;;)= ^ V NASH(k;b;;)
and ^ (k;b;;)=e (k;b;;).
The domestic social planner’s problem, as given by the recursive equation (3.1), is solved by
value function iteration. The value function is iterated, alternating between a full optimization and
a recursion of the decision rules, until the value function does not change over successive iterations.
The state space for capital stock includes NK discrete nodes and the state space of bond positions
includes NB discrete nodes. The state space of endogenous states is thus given by 90  40 elements.
3.1 Functional forms and baseline calibration
To evaluate the model numerically, we make assumptions regarding the functional forms of the pro-
duction function, the instantaneous utility function, the ﬁnancial frictions, and the search intensity
process. For the production function, we use the usual constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas form:
f(k;l) = lk1  = k1  (3.2)
where labor share of income is given by .






The CRRA parameter is equal to .
















20Finally, we assume that the probability of a match for the foreign ﬁrms is given as a logistic





where  determines the elasticity of the match probability with respect to eﬀort. A low level of
 means that the probability of a match is not very sensitive to search eﬀort. In our model for a
given cost of eﬀort, if the elasticity  is low, then domestic ﬁrms’ value has to fall far below the
unconstrained value of the ﬁrm to induce much search eﬀort and a large number of FDI transactions.
If, alternatively, the elasticity is high, then a small deviation of the ﬁrms’ domestic value from the
unconstrained value induce more search eﬀort and more FDI transactions.
In terms of the calibration, we follow standard practice in the real business cycle (RBC) literature
and set our model’s parameters to match standard features of Mexican data and international data.
We ﬁrst determine the values for technology and preference parameters (;;). We ﬁnd that Mexican
data from the Mexican Statistical Institute (INEGI) suggests an average labor income share for the
period 1988-96 of 0.341. Compared to evidence from other countries, this share seems quite low.11
Hence, we adopt instead a labor share  equal to 0.65, which is in line with international evidence.
In terms of preference parameters, we choose the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion  equal to 2.0,
roughly in line with other international RBC studies. The gross annual real interest rate is set to 6%.
We set the rate of time preference,  equal to 0:984, which is the inverse of the real interest rate.12
The calibration yields a deterministic stationary state that replicates Mexico’s 1970-95 average GDP
shares of private consumption and investment at current prices. Using data from the World Bank’s
Development Indicators, the consumption share is equal to 0:684 and the investment share is equal
to 0:217. Our model yields a steady state consumption share equal to 0:687 and an investment share
equal to 0:307.
We now discuss the calibration of the ﬁnancial frictions parameters (b;sec;;; ;). We set
the debt issuance cost parameter b equal to 0.075 so that, in steady state, debt is roughly 13% of
GDP, which is consistent with the Mexican data if only private ﬂows are examined. To set the equity
issuance cost parameter, we appeal to the empirical evidence on transaction costs for public oﬀerings.
To launch an equity or debt oﬀering, domestic ﬁrms pay direct and indirect transaction costs based
11See Mendoza (2006) for more discussion on the controversy surrounding measures of labor income shares for Mexico.
12The functional form assumed for the debt issuance costs pins down the steady state debt level.
21on the ﬁrm size and the size of the oﬀering. For the costs of equity issuance, the direct costs consist
of administrative fees and underwriting costs. Data for the U.S. show that while administrative fees
are minimal, the underwriting discount can be substantial. According to Lee et al. (1996) direct
costs are 7% on average of the proceeds of seasoned equity oﬀerings, 11% for IPOs, and 2   3% for
bonds issuances. International oﬀerings tend to be signiﬁcantly higher. Issuing American Depository
Receipts on the New York Stock Exchange, for instance, requires costly conversion to U.S. accounting
standards and many additional fees. We set the secondary issuance cost parameter sec equal to 0.04.
In steady state, the domestic share of the capital stock  is 0.92, which is consistent with the ﬁndings
of Mendoza and Smith (2006). In terms of the search parameters, the bargaining power of the domestic
household is   = 0:1, the elasticity of the matching probability is  = 0:5, and the rate of separation
 is set to 0.0788.
Given the Markov process of productivity shocks, the standard deviation and ﬁrst-order auto-
correlation of GDP match the standard deviation and ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of the HP-ﬁltered
quarterly cyclical component of Mexico’s GDP reported in Mendoza (2006). In terms of the simple
persistence rule, this requires H = 0:0178 and the autocorrelation of the shock equal to 0:683.
4 Quantitative results
Given the calibrated parameters, we follow the numerical solution technique outlined in Section 3 to
derive the decision rules for the state variables. The decision rules are then used to calculate simulated
business cycle statistics. The goal of the quantitative results is twofold. First, we compare the business
cycle statistics of the model with frictions to the nearly frictionless case to assess the quantitative
impacts of the frictions. Second, we compare the business cycle statistics of the simulated data to the
actual data to determine if the model can capture capital ﬂow dynamics in Mexico.
4.1 Business cycle dynamics
The key to our model’s ability to capture the dynamics of capital inﬂows is that ﬁnancial frictions
determine how a ﬁrm ﬁnances its investment. Since the limiting distribution of our endogenous state
variables determine the moments for all the macro aggregates, we ﬁrst examine the impact of the
ﬁnancial frictions on the limiting distribution of both bonds and capital. Figure 3 compares the
22distribution of capital in a nearly frictionless economy to one in which the ﬁnancial frictions are
present. The frictions tend to lower investment, shifting the distribution of capital to the left and
resulting in a slightly lower mean capital stock. While the frictions have a relatively small impact on
capital, the distribution of bonds diﬀers dramatically under ﬁnancial frictions, as evident in Figure 4.
Small changes in costs have a large impact on the distribution of debt, as ﬁrms choose other means
of ﬁnancing.
To show the impact of the ﬁnancial frictions on the business cycle statistics, Table 4 compares
simulated macro aggregates from the model with frictions to both the nearly frictionless model and the
actual data. Examining the standard deviations (both absolute and relative to GDP) of consumption,
both models tend to underestimate consumption volatility. Consistent with the theory, frictions make
consumption smoothing more costly; the standard deviation of consumption relative to GDP increases
from 0:44 in the frictionless case to 0:51 in the benchmark calibration. The relative standard deviation
of consumption under the benchmark calibration still falls short of the 1:60 found in the Mexican
data. The investment volatility falls dramatically as a result of the frictions. With frictions, the
relative standard deviation of investment, 4:38, is close to the 3:71 observed in the data. In the
model, even without explicit capital adjustment costs, the ﬁnancial frictions cut investment volatility
in half relative to the nearly frictionless case. Along with investment, the current account volatility
also falls sharply, but remains almost twice as volatile relative to GDP as in the data.
We turn to the correlations between the macro aggregates in the last two columns of Table 4. Con-
sistent with the notion of Fisherian separation, in the frictionless model consumption and investment
dynamics are nearly uncorrelated (correlation of 0.02). Due to reduced risk sharing associated with
increased ﬁnancial frictions, the correlation between investment increases to 0:23 in the benchmark
parameterization. The correlation is still below 0:55 found in the data. Due to the lack of impediments
to capital mobility, in the frictionless model there is almost a perfect negative correlation between
the current account and investment. With frictions, consumption and investment begin to move to-
gether and lessen capital ﬂows in response to productivity shocks, lowering the correlation between
the current account and investment.
Table 5 shows the dynamic composition of ﬂows over the business cycle as determined by costly
external ﬁnancing and search costs. Since the composition of capital ﬂows is indeterminate in the
frictionless case, we only compare the benchmark model moments to the Mexican data. The ﬁrst two
23columns of Table 5 report the correlation of the diﬀerent types of inﬂows with GDP and investment.
In qualitative terms, the model matches well the correlation between the diﬀerent types of ﬂows
with investment and with GDP. Quantitatively, the model does a much better job at tracking the
correlations with investment than with GDP. Consistent with the ﬁrst stylized fact, in the model
the correlation between investment and total inﬂows, measured as a percent of GDP, is positive.
The model overstates the relationship somewhat. This positive correlation is consistent with the
theory that capital inﬂows are used to ﬁnance investment. Consistent with the second stylized fact,
the correlation of each type of ﬂow with investment varies dramatically, mirroring the data. While
portfolio equity and debt inﬂows, each measured as a percent of GDP, both have a positive correlation
with investment (0:80 and 0:66, respectively), the model yields a negative correlation between FDI
and investment ( 0:39).
The last three columns on Table 5 show the impact of costly external ﬁnancing and search costs
for multinationals on the interaction between ﬂows. Consistent with the third stylized fact, the model
generates a a negative correlation between FDI and debt but a positive correlation between portfolio
equity and debt inﬂows. As Section 2.3 indicates, the negative correlation between debt and FDI
may not be a simple validation that two types of ﬂows are substitutes. Because FDI is the proceeds
from a change in ownership from a domestic agent to a foreign ownership, the value of FDI depends
both on the number of transactions that occur and the sale price. These two components of FDI
may not necessarily move together. The reason the model matches the data so well comes from
the cyclical nature of the “valuation eﬀect.” As a ﬁrm accumulates capital, the option value for the
managers of the domestic ﬁrm increases and therefore, in a Nash bargain, the sale price must rise. The
negative correlation between FDI and debt emerges because the capital stock increases only after the
ﬁrm borrows from abroad. As borrowing eventually becomes more expensive, ﬁrms reduce additional
borrowing and more FDI takes place at a relatively high price as ﬁrms have built their capital stock
using debt. If, alternatively, domestic ﬁrms would not have been able to borrow and thus would not
have been able to build their capital stocks, the value of FDI may have been low even if the number
of transactions were high because the price of those transactions would have been depressed.
To further demonstrate the frictions’ impact on capital ﬂow dynamics, Figure 5 plots key macro
aggregates simulated responses to a one standard deviation productivity shock. The positive pro-
ductivity shocks encourage investment and ﬁrms ﬁnance that investment abroad. While debt (not
24plotted) and portfolio equity ﬂows in immediately to meet the investment needs, FDI falls initially
due to the valuation eﬀect and only increases after the capital stock is built up and the foreign value
of the ﬁrm increases.
4.2 Sensitivity analysis
The calibration of the costly external ﬁnancing function is challenging because the ﬁnancing costs
are both explicit and implicit, making them diﬃcult to document, particularly for Mexico. To show
robustness of the results, Table 6 shows standard business cycle statistics for the model solved for
diﬀering levels of the bond and equity issuance cost parameters. Several results are worth noting. First,
as the ﬁnancial frictions rise, saving and investment become more correlated. Thus, ﬁnancial frictions
internal to the domestic economy may drive up the time series correlation of savings and investment,
as Feldstein and Horioka (1980) conjecture. The correlation of investment with debt and FDI varies
slightly with the degree of ﬁnancial friction. Finally, and more importantly, the correlation between
the two types of ﬁnancial inﬂows can change depending on the magnitude of the ﬁnancial friction. The
ﬁnal two columns on Table 6 show the impact on the relationship between FDI and debt as we alter the
parameters of costly search. These parameters may be more closely tied to non-ﬁnancial institutions
within an emerging market. The ease or diﬃculty of ﬁnding a match and the bargaining power of the
domestic ﬁrm can be linked to many exogenous factors such as distance, information asymmetries,
and property rights. The search elasticity and the bargaining power impact the correlation between
inﬂows but exert less of an inﬂuence on the correlation of inﬂows with investment. As the search
elasticity falls, the negative correlation between FDI and portfolio equity increases to  0:63. In terms
of the bargaining power, as the domestic agents’ bargaining power increases and the multinationals
earn less of the surplus, the correlation between debt and FDI falls. This is consistent with the fact
that FDI ﬂows seem to be driven by valuation (sale price) eﬀects versus volume (number of sales)
eﬀects.
The sensitivity of the results to the calibration is important for explaining the heterogeneity in the
composition of ﬂows across various emerging market economies. As Table 1 shows, while debt and FDI
are substitutes, the magnitude of the correlation diﬀers by country. In light of the sensitivity analysis,
we can link this heterogeneity to both varying degrees of access to external ﬁnancing captured in
the adjustment cost functions for debt and equity and institutional factors in the economy that drive
25search costs.
5 Conclusions
This paper provides a theoretical model to disentangle the co-movement between diﬀerent types of
capital ﬂows across the business cycle. We augment the canonical model of a ﬁrm ﬁnancing decision
to ﬁt an international framework appropriate for emerging markets. After calibrating the model to
Mexico, the simulation results suggest that the model is successful at matching several key stylized
facts. First, the model is successful in generating a positive correlation between total inﬂows and
investment as ﬁrms use the capital inﬂows to ﬁnance investment. Second, while bonds and portfolio
equity tend to move with investment, FDI tends to be counter to investment. Third, we show how
costly external ﬁnance for domestic ﬁrms and search costs for multinationals work together to generate
a large degree of substitutability between FDI and portfolio equity as well as between FDI and debt,
but a high degree of complementarity between portfolio equity and debt inﬂows. From the sensitivity
results, it is clear that diﬀerences in the magnitude of ﬁnancial frictions in diﬀerent countries can
generate a large changes in the correlations between diﬀerent types of inﬂows and between the inﬂows
and investment.
This work suggests that, counter to traditional thinking, the volatility in speciﬁc types of ﬂows is
not necessarily unhealthy for an emerging market. If, as this work suggests, ﬂows are an equilibrium
outcome of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing decisions arising from ﬁnancial imperfections, then the volatility of capital
ﬂows observed in the real world may simply a result of optimizing behavior. Thus, it would be
preferable to address the underlying cause of volatility, the institutional features that lead to ﬁnancial
imperfections, rather than to use capital controls to improve domestic welfare. The important next
step is to use the framework we presented here to consider the welfare implications of various policies
used to control the ﬂow of capital to emerging markets.
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28Figure 1: Rolling Correlations with Investment
Notes: 10 year rolling correlations. All ﬂows are quarterly gross inﬂows as a percent of GDP, ﬁltered using
Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) band pass (BP) ﬁlter. FDI refers to foreign direct investment, PE refers to
portfolio equity, and debt refers to private debt. Investment expressed in real log per capital terms and ﬁltered
using BP ﬁlter. BP ﬁlter removes trend, assumes a random walk, and is symmetric and stationary. First and
last 12 observations are lost due to ﬁltering. Data span: 1981Q1–2006Q1. Source: IFS.
Figure 2: Rolling Correlations between Inﬂows
10 year rolling correlations. Notes: All ﬂows are quarterly gross inﬂows as a percent of GDP, ﬁltered using BP
ﬁlter. FDI refers to foreign direct investment, PE refers to portfolio equity, and debt refers to private debt.
Data span: 1981Q1–2006Q1. Source: IFS.
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Note: The forecasting functions measure the response to a one standard deviation positive productivity shock
as the percent deviation from long run means. The series were simulated based on the benchmark calibration,
conditional on the steady state bond position.
31Table 1: Cyclical behavior of capital inﬂows,
contemporaneous correlation with investment
(I, Total) (I, Debt) (I, FDI) (I, PE)
Latin America 0.254 0.285 -0.009 0.097
Argentina 0.793y 0.733y 0.271y 0.009
Brazil 0.243y 0.106 0.178z 0.354y
Chile -0.486y -0.008 -0.541y 0.015
Mexico 0.330y 0.389y -0.313y 0.016
East Asia & Paciﬁc 0.225 0.287 -0.109 -0.049
Hong Kong 0.333y 0.354y 0.413y -0.313z
Indonesia -0.129 0.100 -0.132 -0.243z
South Korea 0.457y 0.494y -0.171y -0.012
Thailand 0.424y 0.483y -0.706y 0.197z
Eastern Europe 0.338 0.548 -0.533 0.142
Hungary 0.028 0.434y -0.627y 0.132
Turkey 0.649y 0.663y -0.439y 0.151z
Notes: ysigniﬁcant at 10% level. zsigniﬁcant at 20% level.  measures the correlation. All ﬂows are quarterly
gross inﬂows as a percent of GDP, ﬁltered using Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) band pass (BP) ﬁlter. FDI
refers to foreign direct investment, PE refers to portfolio equity, and debt refers to private debt. Investment
expressed in real log per capital terms and ﬁltered using BP ﬁlter. BP ﬁlter removes trend, assumes a random
walk, and is symmetric and stationary. First and last 12 observations are lost due to ﬁltering. Latin America
consists of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. East Asia & Paciﬁc consists of Hong Kong,
South Korea, Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand. Eastern Europe consists of Hungary and Turkey. Source:
IFS. Source: IFS.
32Table 2: Inﬂow substitutability
(FDI, PE) (FDI, Debt) (PE, Debt)
Latin America -0.077 -0.131 0.219
Argentina -0.871y 0.015 0.197z
Brazil -0.149 -0.351y 0.448y
Chile 0.377y -0.105 0.271y
Mexico -0.135z -0.245y 0.347y
East Asia & Paciﬁc 0.141 -0.080 0.242
Hong Kong 0.277z 0.196 0.373y
Indonesia 0.164 0.266z 0.781y
South Korea 0.324y -0.188y -0.018
Thailand 0.077 -0.515y -0.309y
Eastern Europe -0.196 -0.431 0.143
Hungary -0.100 -0.353y 0.215z
Turkey -0.293y -0.508y 0.071
Notes: ysigniﬁcant at 10% level. zsigniﬁcant at 20% level.  measures the correlation. All ﬂows are quarterly gross
inﬂows as a percent of GDP, ﬁltered using BP ﬁlter. FDI refers to foreign direct investment, PE refers to portfolio
equity, and debt refers to private debt. Latin America consists of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico,
and Peru. East Asia & Paciﬁc consists of Hong Kong, South Korea, Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand.
Eastern Europe consists of Hungary and Turkey. Source: IFS.
Table 3: Summary statistics: Mexico
i i=y (i,Y) (i,I) (i,Debt) (i,FDI) (i,PE)
GDP 2:079 1:000 1:000 0:760 0:337  0:266 0:125
Investment 7:705 3:705 0:760 1:000 0:389  0:313 0:016
Consumption 3:324 1:599 0:854 0:549 0:366  0:102 0:104
Saving 2:875 1:383  0:170 0:165  0:165  0:224  0:068
Current account (% GDP) 0:483 0:232  0:716  0:611  0:393 0:068  0:013
Total Inﬂows (%GDP) 0:804 0:387 0:306 0:330 0:979  0:119 0:485
Debt (% GDP) 0:767 0:369 0:337 0:389 1:000  0:246 0:348
FDI (% GDP) 0:111 0:053  0:266  0:313  0:246 1:000  0:135
PE (% GDP) 0:139 0:067 0:125 0:016 0:348  0:135 1:000
i is the standard deviation reported in percentage terms. i=y is the ratio of the standard deviation relative
to GDP. (i;j) is the correlation of the row with series j. All ﬂows are quarterly gross inﬂows as a percent of
GDP, ﬁltered using BP ﬁlter. FDI refers to foreign direct investment, PE refers to portfolio equity, and debt
refers to private debt. Investment and consumption expressed in real log per capital terms and ﬁltered using
BP ﬁlter. Data span: 1981Q1–2006Q1. Source: IFS.
33Table 4: Simulated Business Cycle Statistics I
i i=y (i;Y ) (i;I)
Nearly Frictionless SOE
GDP 2.27 1.00 1.00 0.27
Investment 20.07 8.83 0.27 1.00
Consumption 1.00 0.44 0.42 0.02
Current Account (%GDP) 5.66 1.15 0.07 -0.94
SOE with Financial Frictions
GDP 2.21 1.00 1.00 0.58
Investment 9.66 4.38 0.58 1.00
Consumption 1.12 0.51 0.77 0.28
Current Account (%GDP) 2.19 0.46 -0.03 -0.81
Mexican Data
GDP 2.08 1.00 1.00 0.76
Investment 7.71 3.71 0.76 1.00
Consumption 3.32 1.60 0.85 0.55
Current Account (%GDP) 0.48 0.23 -0.72 -0.61
Note: The nearly frictionless model is calibrated with relatively very small ﬁnancing costs on bond issuance
and no search or portfolio equity costs. i represents the standard deviation. i=y is standard of deviation
ratio with GDP. (i;y) is correlation with GDP. (i;I) is correlation with investment.
Table 5: Simulated Business Cycle Statistics II
(i;Y ) (i;I) (i;Debt) (i;FDI) (i;PE)
SOE with Financial Frictions
Total Inﬂows (%GDP) 0.03 0.81 0.99 -0.20 0.14
Debt (%GDP) 0.08 0.80 1.00 -0.18 0.11
FDI (%GDP) -0.13 -0.39 -0.18 1.00 -0.57
PE (%GDP) 0.86 0.66 0.11 -0.57 1.00
Mexican Data
Total Inﬂows (%GDP) 0.31 0.33 0.98 -0.12 0.49
Debt (%GDP) 0.34 0.39 1.00 -0.25 0.35
FDI (%GDP) -0.27 -0.31 -0.25 1.00 -0.14
PE (%GDP) 0.13 0.02 0.35 -0.14 1.00
Notes: (i;y) is the correlation with GDP. (i;I) is the correlation with investment. (i;Debt) is the correlation
with debt inﬂows as a percent of GDP. (i;FDI) is the correlation with FDI as a percent of GDP. (i;PE) is
the correlation with portfolio equity inﬂows as a percent of GDP.
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